Entende o contexto
Lê a operação, o cliente e o histórico antes de propor qualquer coisa.
Vendas, marketing, atendimento, operação, financeiro e inteligência trabalhando sobre o mesmo contexto — para sua empresa ganhar escala sem perder controle.
Sua empresa inteira. Uma operação. IA trabalhando.
Para empresas de qualquer setor que querem crescer com estrutura, controle e inteligência.
Painel ilustrativo do Sistema Centriu com sete frentes trabalhando: atendimento, comercial, operação, agentes, inteligência, conteúdo e marketing. Cada frente mostra o trabalho concluído ou o próximo passo.
Representação ilustrativa do trabalho em execução
Não é falta de ferramenta. É que cada ferramenta resolve um pedaço, e ninguém é dono do todo. O custo disso não aparece numa fatura — aparece no mês seguinte.
Sistemas que não se falam
O mesmo dado é digitado de novo — e cada cópia conta uma história diferente.
Dados duplicados
Ninguém sabe qual versão é a verdadeira na hora de decidir.
Conversas perdidas
O cliente repete o contexto a cada canal e a cada pessoa.
Tarefas espalhadas
O trabalho vive em planilhas, mensagens e na memória de alguém.
Decisões sem contexto
A escolha é feita com o recorte que estava à mão, não com o que importava.
Automações desconectadas
Cada ferramenta automatiza um pedaço e ninguém enxerga o todo.
Nenhum desses problemas se resolve comprando mais um software. Eles se resolvem quando a operação inteira passa a trabalhar sobre o mesmo contexto.
A Centriu não é uma coleção de produtos. É uma plataforma em que clientes, áreas e agentes leem e escrevem no mesmo lugar.
Cliente 360
Um contexto, não vários cadastros
Cada conversa, tarefa, campanha, cobrança e decisão fica ligada ao cliente e à operação — não a um sistema isolado.
As áreas abaixo são partes da mesma operação, não produtos separados. Elas compartilham conta, permissões e histórico.
A inteligência artificial da Centriu participa da operação: entende contexto, prepara trabalho, executa rotinas e pede aprovação quando importa.
Lê a operação, o cliente e o histórico antes de propor qualquer coisa.
Redige, organiza, calcula e deixa pronto para revisão humana.
Roda o que é repetitivo dentro dos limites definidos pela empresa.
Cruza áreas, identifica prioridade e mostra o motivo da recomendação.
O que é sensível passa por uma pessoa antes de valer. Sem exceção silenciosa.
Registra o que aconteceu e usa o resultado para melhorar a próxima decisão.
Uma plataforma, várias frentes de trabalho. Tudo no mesmo contexto, com a IA participando do que dá para acelerar.
CRM, pipeline, oportunidades, propostas, follow-up e automações.
WhatsApp, Instagram, Messenger, chat do site e e-mail no mesmo contexto.
Tarefas, responsáveis, prazos, aprovações, agenda e capacidade.
Contas, cobranças, caixa, fiscal, margem, IR, orçamento e inteligência econômica.
Planejar, produzir, aprovar, publicar e medir conteúdo e campanhas.
Painéis, alertas, previsões, recomendações e leitura executiva.
Rotinas executadas continuamente pela IA com controle e aprovação.
Diagnóstico, estratégia, transformação, acompanhamento e especialistas.
A Centriu faz sentido quando o volume aumenta e a estrutura precisa acompanhar. Não é sobre setor nem tamanho: é sobre a operação conseguir sustentar o próximo estágio.
As vendas crescem, mas o processo não acompanha.
As áreas trabalham separadas e o cliente sente.
A operação depende de pessoas específicas.
O financeiro ficou complexo e o caixa perde visibilidade.
O atendimento cresce em volume e em canais.
A IA entra sem contexto, controle ou histórico.
Se a empresa ainda não começou a crescer, a Centriu também ajuda a preparar a estrutura para o primeiro salto.
Ver a Centriu funcionandoA Centriu combina tecnologia, inteligência, método e acompanhamento. A consultoria diagnostica, desenha, implanta e acompanha — com evidências, não com apresentação.
Diagnóstico e imersão na operação
Estratégia e prioridades
Roadmap de transformação
Desenho da arquitetura operacional
Implantação conduzida
Acompanhamento com evidências
Benchmarking e leitura de mercado
Especialistas, rede e inteligência coletiva
Uma conversa para entender onde a sua operação perde tempo, dinheiro ou capacidade — e o que a Centriu faria primeiro.
problema
When something goes wrong with an AI agent, model or provider, the two common failure modes are opposite and both expensive: overreacting by shutting down more than the incident requires, or underreacting because the only available response is an all-or-nothing switch. Centriu TrustOps defines sixteen ascending control levels — from reinforced observation up to an organization-wide emergency stop — each mapped to a specific, real effect: restricting new actions, forcing read-only mode, blocking external communication or financial actions, cancelling in-flight executions, revoking credentials, ending sessions, isolating an integration, or placing something in full quarantine. A genuine emergency can bypass the normal second approval through a break-glass override, but only under six simultaneous conditions, capped in duration, and with a mandatory review afterward that can rule the action justified, unjustified, or only partially so.

The instinctive design for an emergency control is a single switch: something is wrong, so turn it off. That works when the something is small and isolated. It becomes a problem when the something is one component among many. This could be an agent, a model, a provider, an integration, or a whole department's AI access. A single switch forces a choice between doing too little or doing too much. Doing too little means leaving the actual risk running. This happens because shutting everything down feels too much. Doing too much means stopping work that had nothing to do with the incident. This happens because there was no finer control available. Neither failure is acceptable when AI agents are doing real, ongoing work.
The instinctive design for an emergency control is a single switch: something is wrong, so turn it off. That works when the something is small and isolated. It becomes a problem when the something is one component among many. This could be an agent, a model, a provider, an integration, or a whole department's AI access. A single switch forces a choice between doing too little or doing too much. Doing too little means leaving the actual risk running. This happens because shutting everything down feels too much. Doing too much means stopping work that had nothing to do with the incident. This happens because there was no finer control available. Neither failure is acceptable when AI agents are doing real, ongoing work.
Nineteen distinct control types are ordered into sixteen ascending severity levels. These types range from reinforced observation and restricting new actions. They go up to blocking external communication, blocking writes, blocking deletes, and blocking financial actions. Other types include pausing new executions, cancelling in-flight ones, suspending an identity, revoking credentials, and ending sessions. They also include isolating an integration, full quarantine, blocking a model, pausing a provider, an organization-wide safe mode, and an organization-wide emergency stop. This means a response can be scaled to exactly the risk. It does not have to be rounded up to the nearest blunt instrument. Any of sixteen target types can be addressed independently. This includes a single agent, a group of agents, a specific model, a provider, an integration, a credential, a user, a department, an environment, or the whole organization. So, a command against one agent does not have to touch anything else. Every command moves through a twelve-state lifecycle. These states are requested, awaiting approval, approved, propagating, partially applied, applied, failed, expired, reverting, reverted, cancelled, superseded. There are clear rules for what counts as currently active. These are applied, partially applied or still propagating. There are also clear rules for what counts as terminal. These are reverted, cancelled, superseded or expired. So, a command's real-world status is never unclear. Applying a command spreads across the real components it actually needs to reach. These include the AI gateway, identity, credentials, sessions, queues, workers, caches, tokens, integrations, providers, models, the connected Core and Axis systems, plus evidence and incident records. Each target reports its own status independently. So, a partial failure on one component is visible. It is not hidden inside an overall "done." Quarantine itself has four distinct forms. These are full, partial, read-only, and network-isolated. It also has an eight-state lifecycle. This includes an explicit "awaiting release approval" step. So, releasing a quarantined asset is never a single unchecked click. For a genuine emergency, a break-glass override can bypass the normal second-approval requirement. But this only happens when six conditions hold at once. First, the organization's policy allows break-glass at all. Second, the requesting user specifically holds the exceptional permission. Third, the severity is classified as critical (nothing less). Fourth, a written justification of at least twenty characters is provided. Fifth, no other break-glass window is already active for that user. Sixth, the window itself is capped. This is sixty minutes by default. Every break-glass action is audited. It requires a mandatory second review afterward. This review can conclude the action was justified, unjustified, or only partially justified. Recovery from quarantine or a severe control follows an eight-stage ladder. This includes isolated test, sandbox, homologation, restricted production, read-only, low autonomy, approval required, and finally full production. It is not a single step back to normal. Separate rollback and evidence-hold tracking record whether a reversal is available. They also record whether evidence is still under an active hold.
Nineteen distinct control types are ordered into sixteen ascending severity levels. These range from reinforced observation to an organization-wide emergency stop.
There are sixteen independent target types. So, a command can address one agent, one credential, one integration, one department or the whole organization. It does not force a broader scope.
A twelve-state command lifecycle has defined active states. These are applied, partially applied, and propagating. It also has defined terminal states. These are reverted, cancelled, superseded, and expired.
Propagation happens across the real components a command actually needs to reach. These include the AI gateway, identity, credentials, sessions, queues, workers, caches, tokens, integrations, providers, models, the connected Core and Axis systems, plus evidence and incident records. Each target reports its status independently.
There are four quarantine types: full, partial, read-only, and network-isolated. Each has its own eight-state quarantine lifecycle. This includes an explicit release-approval step before quarantine ends.
A break-glass override is allowed by six conditions at the same time. These are policy permission, exceptional user permission, critical severity only, a minimum 20-character justification, no concurrent active window, and a duration cap defaulting to 60 minutes. There is a mandatory review afterward. This review produces a justified, unjustified or partially-justified outcome.
An eight-stage graduated recovery ladder goes from isolated test to full production. It is not a single step back to normal.
Separate tracking exists for rollback-availability and evidence-hold. So, whether a reversal is possible and whether evidence is preserved are both clear, searchable states.
The structural change is that the response to an AI incident stops being a choice between two extremes. It becomes a scale that can actually match the situation. A single misbehaving agent gets treated as a single misbehaving agent. It is not a reason to interrupt an entire provider or integration that other work depends on. An emergency exception exists for the moment it is genuinely needed. But it is time-boxed. It is based on real criteria. It is always reviewed afterward. It is not left as an unmonitored side door. Recovery is a sequence with checkpoints. It is not a single leap back to full trust. Centriu attaches no figure to what that prevents. It depends entirely on how many agents, providers and integrations an organization runs. It also depends on how disruptive an overcorrection would be for it.
The structural change is that the response to an AI incident stops being a choice between two extremes. It becomes a scale that can actually match the situation. A single misbehaving agent gets treated as a single misbehaving agent. It is not a reason to interrupt an entire provider or integration that other work depends on. An emergency exception exists for the moment it is genuinely needed. But it is time-boxed. It is based on real criteria. It is always reviewed afterward. It is not left as an unmonitored side door. Recovery is a sequence with checkpoints. It is not a single leap back to full trust. Centriu attaches no figure to what that prevents. It depends entirely on how many agents, providers and integrations an organization runs. It also depends on how disruptive an overcorrection would be for it.
An anomaly detection signal flags a single customer-facing AI agent. It flags it for behavior outside its normal pattern. The response targets that one agent specifically. Its new executions are paused. Its in-flight ones are cancelled. This is at level 9 and 10 of the scale. This is well below a full quarantine. Every other agent using the same provider and the same integration continues operating normally. This is because the command's target type was scoped to the one agent. It was not scoped to the provider or the integration behind it.
The investigation escalates. The agent is moved into full quarantine. It is network-isolated. Its credentials are revoked. Its sessions are ended. Propagation reaches identity, credential and session components specifically. Each reports back applied independently. A security lead with exceptional permission believes a related credential needs immediate revocation. This is before the investigation formally concludes. This would normally require a second approval. They invoke break-glass. They provide a written justification. The action executes inside a sixty-minute window. Twenty minutes later a second reviewer examines the break-glass action. They mark it justified, closing the loop.
Once the investigation clears the agent, it does not go straight back to full production. It moves through the recovery ladder. This includes sandbox, then homologation, then restricted production. This has a period of required approval on every action. Then it finally reaches full production again. Each stage confirms the fix held before trust is restored further.

Sixteen, ordered from reinforced observation (the lightest) to an organization-wide emergency stop (the most severe), covering nineteen distinct control types.
Yes — sixteen independent target types exist, from a single agent up to the whole organization. A command only spreads to the components its specific target needs.
Six things must be true at once. The organization's policy allows it. The user has the special permission. The severity is critical. The justification is at least 20 characters. No other break-glass window is active for that user. The window has a time limit, usually sixty minutes.
Yes — it is mandatory. The review concludes the action was justified, unjustified, or partially justified. There is no way to skip this review.
No — recovery follows an eight-stage ladder. This includes isolated test, sandbox, homologation, restricted production, read-only, low autonomy, approval required, and full production. It is not a single step.
Full, partial, read-only, and network-isolated. Each has its own eight-state lifecycle. This includes an explicit release-approval step before quarantine ends.
It is sold by subscription with a published starting price. Exact current values are on the central pricing page.
When something goes wrong with an AI agent, model or provider, the two common failure modes are opposite and both expensive: overreacting by shutting down more than the incident requires, or underreacting because the only available response is an all-or-nothing switch. Centriu TrustOps defines sixteen ascending control levels — from reinforced observation up to an organization-wide emergency stop — each mapped to a specific, real effect: restricting new actions, forcing read-only mode, blocking external communication or financial actions, cancelling in-flight executions, revoking credentials, ending sessions, isolating an integration, or placing something in full quarantine. A genuine emergency can bypass the normal second approval through a break-glass override, but only under six simultaneous conditions, capped in duration, and with a mandatory review afterward that can rule the action justified, unjustified, or only partially so.